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The Role of Decision-Making Biases in Ireland’s Banking Crisis 
 
1.  Introduction 
The report of the Commission for Investigation into the Banking Sector in Ireland (Nyberg, 
2011) enters new territory in the search for the root causes of Ireland’s banking crisis. It 
argues that the many institutional and policy failings identified by the Commission, and by 
previous investigations, are insufficient to explain the extent and simultaneity of poor 
economic and financial decisions in the period prior to the crisis. Rather, “stronger, irrational 
forces were present” (p. 94). Specifically, the Commission concludes that bankers, regulators 
and others were prey to “herding” and to “groupthink”, leading them to underestimate risk 
substantially and with calamitous consequences. In turning to these two phenomena for 
explanation, the Commission departs from previous analyses by drawing on behavioural 
economics and related disciplines, such as behavioural finance, economic psychology and 
cognitive economics, which apply insights from psychology to economic contexts.  
 
The present paper attempts a more exhaustive look at what these disciplines have to offer 
for understanding Ireland’s banking crisis. Herding and groupthink belong to a category of 
phenomena that describe how our individual decisions gravitate towards the decisions of 
others around us, potentially magnifying mistakes. These phenomena form a significant 
subset of a much broader set of scientifically established influences on economic judgement 
and decision-making. Specifically, relatively recent advances in behavioural economics have 
improved understanding of how we make future projections, handle risk and uncertainty, 
and consider trade-offs over time. More is now understood also about the roles of 
optimism, confidence and scepticism in how we form and question our beliefs. What follows 
examines Ireland’s crisis from the perspective of this work. 
 
The present analysis largely (and necessarily for reasons of space) ignores many non-
psychological causes of Ireland’s banking crisis, although at various points below interactions 
between institutional and psychological factors are highlighted. The three official inquiries 
(Honohan, 2010; Regling and Watson, 2010; Nyberg, 2011) do a thorough job of examining 
the macroeconomic background, the role of various institutions, and the policy decisions 
that contributed to (or at least failed to prevent) the banking crisis.  
 
Briefly, these reports show that from 2002 onwards Ireland’s banks borrowed from 
international wholesale markets to fund increases in lending that were massive by 
international standards. The speed and scale of this expansion, driven by increased domestic 
competition, access to cheap international finance and apparent initial success, could only 
be achieved by a weakening of lending standards and large-scale wholesale borrowing. As 
extensively documented in the official reports, internal bank policies and rules governing 
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lending were increasingly bypassed and  relaxed in a race to expand. Bank exposures 
became heavily concentrated in property-related assets, which benefitted from tax 
advantages, further concentrated in commercial property deals, and yet further among a 
relatively small number of developers. The reports reveal that the Financial Regulator failed 
to notice the danger and did not properly regulate governance and prudential standards, 
contributing to poor lending decisions. Similarly, the Central Bank failed to recognise 
associated financial stability issues or to notice the extent of systemic risk, instead placing 
emphasis on public and market perceptions. Consequently, the evidence suggests that the 
authorities, including the Department of Finance and leading politicians, did not seriously 
entertain the possibility that any bank was insolvent until late 2008, after the bank 
guarantee was announced. The failure was not limited to these key actors, however. The risk 
of a large fall in property prices was also underestimated by the wider community of 
journalists, experts and the public, including house-buyers. While some warnings were 
sounded in relation to specific pieces of the crisis jigsaw, economic and financial experts did 
not put the pieces together fast and accurately enough to provide useful warnings that 
reflected the scale of the problem. “Domestic doubters were few, late and usually low-key” 
(Nyberg, 2011, p. viii).1 Furthermore, although Ireland’s crisis differs fundamentally from the 
global financial crisis,2 it developed in an international context of widespread belief in the 
efficient markets hypothesis, deregulated markets, and consequent underestimation of the 
macroeconomic dangers posed by modern financial markets.    
 
What follows does not challenge the above account, which provides the essential framework 
into which various decision-makers fit. Nor does it question the causes of the crisis as 
identified by these official investigations, without which the present analysis would not be 
possible. The aim is to complement these analyses by adding a stronger behavioural 
economic dimension, such that potential psychological factors are examined more 
scientifically.  
 
                                                                                 
 
1  Despite this conclusion in the Commission’s report, which is accepted here, some economic 
experts and commentators continue to hold that warnings were given and that the primary 
problem is that they were ignored by the authorities and politicians. Ultimately, whether the 
warnings were sufficiently timely, accurate and severe is partly a subjective judgement. It also 
requires historical analysis beyond the scope of this paper. However, despite following up on 
many suggestions, this author has yet to encounter any paper or article prior to Kelly (2007) that 
contained a warning that came close to reflecting the scale of what was ultimately to occur. 
2  It is important to note that the Irish banking crisis differs fundamentally from the crisis that 
enveloped the global financial system. Although they share a number of things in common (a 
property bubble, bad loans, a long period of relative prosperity, intense competition in an era of 
deregulation and international integration of financial services), the Irish banking crisis did not 
revolve around bad loans being effectively hidden by complex securitisation, whereby financial 
assets were generated and traded that could only be valued via complex mathematical models. 
Rather, the Irish crisis centred on the more timeless and straightforward failing of reckless lending 
and borrowing (Honohan, 2009; Regling and Watson, 2010). 
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 addresses method. It argues for a more scientific 
approach to understanding decision-making during the banking crisis; defines seven well-
established judgement and decision-making phenomena that may be relevant; and discusses 
the type of evidence available to assess their role. Section 3 evaluates the possible influence 
of these seven phenomena, sketching hypotheses and sifting evidence. Section 4 concludes 
and discusses possible implications for crisis-prevention and financial regulation. 
 
2.  A Behavioural Economic Perspective 
Any comprehensive analysis of Ireland’s banking crisis must include an account of why so 
many people, in a range of different circumstances and roles, took decisions or made 
judgements they would later regret, either because of personal loss or a sense of failure. 
Property developers and other businesspeople over-extended themselves and ruined their 
businesses. Bankers broke their banks through reckless lending, mostly related to property; 
some also broke themselves, as they personally held much of their wealth in bank shares 
and property. People bought houses that turned out to be worth hundreds of thousands of 
euro less than they paid for them. Regulators, central bankers, civil servants and politicians 
failed to protect the people they served, with disastrous reputational and electoral 
consequences. Economists and other experts failed to provide timely, accurate and 
sufficiently salient warnings, damaging professional status. Nyberg (2011) concludes that the 
key issue for understanding Ireland’s banking crisis is to uncover why these disadvantageous 
decisions and judgements were taken by so many people, in so many different contexts, 
simultaneously. 
 
2.1  Beyond Folk Psychology 
To date, analyses of Ireland’s property bubble and consequent banking crisis, while isolating 
many important institutional factors, have mostly fallen back on psychological 
generalisations to explain this array of consequential misjudgements. Regling and Watson 
(2010) refer to “euphoric conditions”, a “national blind-spot” and misjudgements that were 
“embedded in collective psychology”. Honohan (2009, 2010) describes how the banks were 
caught up in the “mass psychology” of the bubble; a “construction frenzy”; international 
financial markets were “hysterical”; government policy created “a climate of public opinion 
which was led to believe that the party could last forever.” Whelan (2010) pins the blame 
more straightforwardly on “over-optimism”, especially in relation to the likelihood of the 
continuation of Ireland’s abnormally high economic growth. In addition to hypothesising the 
existence of herding and groupthink, Nyberg (2011) refers to a national “mania”; Fitz Gerald 
(2011) calls it “madness”. 
 
Thus, while the investigations cited above offer extensive and incisive analysis of various 
causes of the crisis, their descriptions of psychological processes remain mostly in the realm 
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of “folk psychology” – the everyday narrative of how and why people behave as they do. 
Folk psychological descriptions of bubbles mostly evoke heightened emotional states, like 
euphoria, frenzy or mania, and we intuitively associate rash decision-making with such 
extreme states. Controlled empirical investigations do show that economic decisions can be 
influenced by emotions (see Rick and Loewenstein, 2009, for review). Decisions can be 
affected by immediate moods and, more consistently, investigators have shown that 
decisions are altered by the anticipation of future emotions, usually negative ones such as 
disappointment or regret. Yet there are in general good reasons to doubt the notion that 
heightened positive emotions adequately capture the highly correlated decision-making that 
characterises bubbles. Decisions such as investments or house purchases are rarely snap 
judgements, but are usually considered over extended periods and, consequently, in a 
variety of moods.3 Tellingly, beginning with Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988), bubbles 
and crashes have been observed in experimental asset markets in which subjects trade 
tokens with probabilistically determined pay-offs. Experimenters have complete control over 
the information available to traders and their communication with fellow market 
participants. Thus, bubbles and crashes occur in the absence of broader societal influences, 
be they infectious emotional states or widespread false beliefs about the future with respect 
to, say, the fixed supply of land or the impact of a new technology. Cognitive biases, such as 
extrapolation bias, offer a more plausible explanation for the observed behaviour (see 
Section 3.1 and Barberis, 2010, for theoretical overview).  
 
This example illustrates how progress in behavioural economics can make it possible to 
improve on folk-psychological descriptions by considering psychological processes more 
scientifically, concentrating on phenomena that are well-defined and subject to empirical 
isolation and verification. The analysis that follows investigates the potential role in Ireland’s 
banking crisis of seven such measurable, systematic behaviours. It is hoped that this 
approach increases scientific tractability and, therefore, improves our ability to recognise 
future economic problems more quickly and helps to design policies to, where necessary, 
counteract them. 
 
2.2  Mistakes, Biases and Rational Behaviour 
Table 1 defines seven systematic findings in studies of economic judgement and decision-
making. The seven phenomena are selected, firstly, because there is good field evidence 
that they operate in real market settings and, secondly, for their potential contribution to 
understanding the crisis. In principle, all seven could  influence expectations about the 
future value of an asset.  
 
                                                                                 
 
3  Note that this disting uishes house price and financial market bubbles, since price movements in 
the latter can be extremely rapid and, therefore, more driven by the emotion of a single day’s 
trading. 
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It is usual to refer to most of these phenomena as behavioural “biases”. Due to its 
prevalence, this terminology has become unavoidable and is adopted here. Yet it is 
unfortunate, since the term “bias” implies that the behaviours are somehow irrational or 
generally result in mistakes and are hence damage welfare. This assumption is related to the 
fact that these phenomena often violate the standard axioms of rationality as defined in 
neoclassical microeconomics. In some contexts the biases probably are disadvantageous and 
the Irish banking crisis may be one such example. But it remains an empirical question as to 
whether each behaviour is damaging overall to the welfare of decision-makers. As some 
have repeatedly pointed out (see Berg and Gigerenzer, 2010, for recent argument), there is 
presently scant evidence that people who exhibit these behaviours suffer worse overall 
economic outcomes. Furthermore, many of the listed biases are observed among trained 
experts, who are in some cases happy to defend the behaviour as generally beneficial.  
 
Table 1: Established behavioural decision-making biases 
Bias Definition 
Extrapolation bias 
(Projection bias, Overinference) 
When predicting future outcomes based on the past, 
placing more weight on the most recent events 
 
Confirmation bias 
(Myside bias) 
The inclination to place greater weight on and to actively 
seek information consistent with prior beliefs 
  
Overconfidence bias 
(Over-optimism bias, 
miscalibration) 
 
A tendency to predict outcomes too positively and to 
overestimate the accuracy of predictions 
  
Ambiguity aversion 
(Aversion to Knightian uncertainty, 
Illusion of explanatory depth) 
Greater willingness to take risks in contexts where people 
feel able to quantify the risk, or where people feel 
relatively competent in assessing the risk.     
 
Behavioural convergence  
(Bandwagon effects, Herding, 
Information cascades, Conformity, 
Groupthink) 
 
The tendency to copy similar decisions made by others, 
or conform to majority views  
 
Time inconsistency 
(Present bias,  
hyperbolic discounting) 
Systematic changes in individual preferences over time, 
whereby more immediate rewards become 
disproportionately attractive 
 
Loss/gain asymmetry 
(Loss aversion, endowment effect) 
Giving greater weight to losses than to equivalent gains, 
including willingness to take risks to avoid or recover 
losses 
 
 
 
Throughout this paper, therefore, the use of the term “bias” does not necessarily imply 
irrationality, poor decision-making or, when applied to professionals, low standards on 
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behalf of individual decision-makers. After all, the ultimate outcomes for individuals in asset 
markets depend also on decisions taken by others – there may be no right answer. It is 
generally the potential collective effect of a bias, when strong and widespread, that is 
illuminating.  
 
The list in Table 1 is non-exhaustive and it is possible to make finer distinctions in some cases 
between the main biases listed on the left in Table 1 and the closely related effects in 
brackets below. Yet the aim is to group phenomena in such a way that their role in the crisis 
can be considered systematically. The two phenomena highlighted by Nyberg (2011) provide 
a useful example. “Groupthink” usually refers to the tendency of individuals within a defined 
group to adopt the group’s viewpoint rather than to form an intellectually independent 
assessment, while “herding” refers to the tendency of decision-makers more generally to 
follow the lead of other decision-makers. The notion of “information cascades” partly 
rationalises such behaviour by suggesting that observing the behaviour of others amounts to 
useful information for the decision-maker. All of the terms listed under “behavioural 
convergence” refer to the tendency to be drawn towards the decisions of others. This 
constitutes the deeper distinction between these terms and the other six listed, which are 
less social and more cognitive. 
 
2.3  Evidence for Behavioural Biases 
In the analysis that follows, each bias is in turn related to specific decision-making contexts 
in Ireland, primarily during the lead up to the crisis over the 2002-2007 period. Some biases 
are potentially relevant also to initial responses, as the full scale of the difficulty confronting 
the banks began to emerge, mostly in 2008. The analysis aims to specify precise hypotheses 
regarding which phenomena were potentially relevant to which sets of decision-makers, and 
to which judgements or decisions. But before turning to specifics, some general 
consideration is required as to the nature of the available evidence and the appropriateness 
of the methodology adopted. 
 
How might one empirically examine such hypotheses and hence assess the likelihood that 
the behaviours listed in Table 1 contributed? The evidence to be weighed comes in two 
forms. The first form of evidence is quantitative in nature and derives from international 
research on judgement and decision-making. The logic is that it is reasonable to infer that a 
bias is more likely to have been instrumental in Ireland’s banking crisis if there is good 
empirical evidence that the bias concerned is a consistent and strong influence on decisions 
taken in similar contexts elsewhere. Most of the biases in Table 1 were initially identified in 
economic laboratory experiments, the results of which offer a general indication of the 
regularity and strength of the particular bias when people make judgements or decisions of 
particular types. Evidence for the role of a bias is more persuasive, however, when gathered 
in real environments that resemble the situations of decision-makers during the crisis. For 
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some phenomena there are relevant field experiments,4 but in most cases the field evidence 
consists of traditional econometric analysis of survey data with indicators that measure or 
proxy a certain bias. Increasingly, surveys include useful psychological indicators, such as 
individual perceptions, expectations or measures of confidence. Where experiments and 
survey data suggest that a bias operates for people in situations that parallel those faced by 
decision-makers before and during Ireland’s crisis, especially if the bias is strong, this adds to 
the case that it may have played a role. For each of the phenomena listed in Table 1, the 
relevant international experimental and survey evidence is therefore summarised.    
 
The second type of evidence examined consists of documentation or personal testimony 
relating to the Irish banking crisis itself, which can to some extent reveal whether observed 
behaviour was consistent with the predictions of a hypothesised bias. Much of the material 
unearthed by the three official inquiries is useful for this purpose. The evidence is 
unfortunately skewed towards decisions taken and judgements made in respect of the 
residential rather than commercial property market, as the former tended to be the subject 
of more discussion and debate at the time, despite the latter’s critical role. 
 
Such qualitative analysis is, of course, to some extent subjective. There may be other 
plausible interpretations of what was written, said and done. Illustrative quotations are 
selective and their representativeness dependent on subjective judgement. Moreover, since 
this exercise explicitly seeks indications that the relevant biases might have been 
instrumental, there is a danger of over-interpreting positive instances of the phenomena 
hypothesised (see Section 3.2 on confirmation bias). It is hence easier to establish the 
presence of a bias than to gauge its strength. But where an established behavioural bias 
predicts a certain behaviour which is then located in testimony or historical documentation, 
this strengthens the claim that the phenomenon was instrumental.  
 
Investigators have employed similar qualitative approaches to study the global financial 
crisis (e.g. Shefrin, forthcoming; Coleman and Pinder, 2010). Based on documents relating to 
decisions taken by major banks and transcripts of meetings within the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), Shefrin finds evidence consistent with overconfidence bias, 
confirmation bias and behavioural convergence. If one accepts the conclusion that these 
behavioural biases influenced US banking supervision, then one might infer that the same 
                                                                                 
 
4  It is often assumed that field experiments are generally superior to laboratory experiments, since 
they provide evidence regarding whether a behaviour occurs in real-world economic settings. 
Laboratory experiments, however, have the unique advantage that the behavioural environment 
can be completely controlled, which permits greater certainty about what actually determines 
behaviour. An example is the study of bubbles in experimental asset markets. Distinguishing the 
effects of false beliefs or social norms from other drivers of bubbles, such as extrapolation bias, 
would be difficult in a field experiment, but can be accomplished in the laboratory. 
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biases were likely to have operated among supervisors in Ireland too. Similar findings in 
Ireland to those of Shefrin’s are examined below.  
 
Lastly, there is an established bias not listed in Table 1 that is nevertheless relevant. 
“Hindsight bias” (Fischoff, 1975) refers to our tendency to perceive an event that has 
occurred as more predictable than actually it was, and to overestimate the degree to which 
we actually did predict it. Hindsight bias is a consistent empirical finding across experimental 
and field studies, involving a range of domains that includes economic predictions (Blank, 
Musch and Pohl, 2007). Arguably, Ireland is living through a period of extreme hindsight 
bias. From the perspective of 2011, given what we know now, the behaviour in the years up 
to 2008 of businesspeople, bankers, house buyers, investors, regulators, civil servants, 
politicians and even journalists and academics, can seem so extraordinary as to indicate an 
epidemic of euphoria, greed or unintelligence. Yet, clearly, many intelligent people who 
were neither euphoric nor greedy got caught up in Ireland’s bubble to the extent that they 
made judgements or decisions that turned out to be bad and, in certain cases, ruinous. What 
ultimately occurred was evidently not, therefore, that obvious or predictable.  
 
Consider the economist who was arguably the first to put the pieces together, conduct 
relevant quantitative analysis and thus infer the potential scale of the crisis. Kelly (2007) was 
a prescient and controversial paper. Based on international historical data, it estimated that 
Irish house prices were likely to fall by 40-60%.5 Yet, when considering the potential 
consequences, the paper stated that “the larger banks which dominate lending are well 
capitalised” (p. 54). Revisiting the paper four years on, the fact that it contains this 
statement may be surprising.6 The surprise is an indication of the dangers of hindsight bias. 
The potential for a large fall in property prices to wreak such havoc in the banks was not at 
all obvious at the time. It seems that way now, when it has become part of our common 
understanding of what occurred. Understanding evolves.7   
 
Hindsight bias looms large for any analysis of what caused the banking crisis and its potential 
influence must, therefore, be borne in mind throughout what follows. In aiming to 
                                                                                 
 
5  Although this paper was published in 2007, its main arguments first appeared in a newspaper 
article in 2006, before the fall in property prices began. 
6  Indeed, within a year the author had changed his mind and was hence again ahead of the field in 
realising the potential extent of bank losses. 
7  Hindsight bias also plagues analyses of the global financial crisis, for which it is possible to perform 
a similar exercise. Nouriel Roubini is usually cited as the economist who first raised the red flag, in 
what proved to be a provocative seminar delivered at the International Monetary Fund in 2006. 
Frequently it is claimed that he saw the global financial crisis coming. The transcript (accessed at 
http://www.businesscycle.com/news/press/1062/) confirms that Roubini expected “a housing 
slump which could lead then to a systemic problem for the financial system”, resulting in 
recession. However, in the same seminar, he also said “I do not expect a global recession, I think it 
is going to be a slowdown”. Thus, even those who were quickest to develop an understanding of 
what was occurring initially underestimated its scale. 
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understand behaviour at the time when the relevant judgements and decisions were made, 
what we know now can mask the truth, making it too easy to assume, incorrectly that key 
decision-makers “must have known”. Consequently, what was written and said at the time is 
more reliable than what has been written and said subsequently. 
 
Overall, given the available types of evidence, it is a matter of judgement as to the extent to 
which the behavioural biases identified contributed to the crisis. In some cases, the analysis 
makes little progress beyond conjecture; in others the qualitative evidence is arguably quite 
strong. The aim is nevertheless to present the evidence in a systematic and balanced 
manner, thereby allowing that judgement to be better informed. 
 
3.  The Role of Specific Decision-Making Biases 
This section examines evidence for each of the potential biases separately. The order in 
which the specific behaviours are presented is not intended to reflect the degree of 
importance attached to each, but to assist in highlighting possible interactions between the 
behaviours. 
 
3.1  Extrapolation Bias 
Where decision-makers must try to anticipate a future outcome, there might be good reason 
to believe that the underlying mechanism producing the outcome is changing over time. If 
so, then the most recent trend will more accurately reflect the state of the underlying 
mechanism, so it makes sense to give it more weight than trends further in the past. 
However, while this “extrapolation bias” may be beneficial most of the time, it may come 
unstuck if the outcome concerned is characterised by short-term momentum and longer-
term (even partial) mean reversion. This dynamic structure, which appears to apply to 
certain macroeconomic time series and asset prices, has the potential to combine with 
extrapolation bias to generate bubbles and crashes (Fuster, Laibson and Mendel, 2010).  
 
Extrapolation bias has been widely studied in asset markets, especially the US stock market, 
and it seems to be ubiquitous. Stock-market investors are biased towards stocks that have 
better recent performance (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Benartzi, 2001). In this context, the 
bias appears to be strong. Barber, Odean and Zhu (2009) show that the average stock 
bought by a large sample of individual investors outperformed the market in the previous 
three years by more than 60%. Most relevant for present purposes, extrapolation bias is 
displayed by consumers with respect to house prices, both in the UK (Muellbauer and 
Murphy, 1997) and the US (Case and Shiller, 2003; Piazzesi and Schneider, 2009).  
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There are some limited data on population expectations of future house prices in Ireland. 
Hughes and Duffy (2007) report that in January 2007, when Irish house prices peaked and 
began their precipitous fall,8 56% of the population expected a continued rise over the 
coming year, while just 15% expected a decline. The results for a five-year time horizon were 
almost indistinguishable, with 58% expecting a rise and just 18% a fall. Only 3% expected, 
correctly, that prices would fall “a lot”. Thus, the public did not anticipate falling prices until 
they had in fact begun to fall, consistent with the extrapolation of more recent trends. 
 
What about expectations among banks, authorities and experts? To assess this, five 
reports/commentaries from a range of relevant organisations were analysed, each of which 
was published at the end of 2006 and discussed prospects for the property market. These 
were: the regular property market assessments of the two biggest banks (AIB, 2006; Bank of 
Ireland, 2006), reports published by two large Dublin stockbrokers (Goodbody Stockbrokers, 
2006; NCB, 2006), and the ESRI Quarterly Economic Commentary for Winter 2006 (Barrett, 
Kearney and  McCarthy, 2006).9 In addition, similar analysis was performed on four annual 
Financial Stability Reports (FSRs), published by the Central Bank and Financial Services 
Authority of Ireland (CBFSAI, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007). Overall, the reports include monthly, 
quarterly and annual commentaries and cover a range of institutions.  
 
Note that the intention here is not to criticise these forecasters and analysts, or to suggest 
that there were shortcomings in their application of professional methods. For, in addition 
to a warranted wariness of hindsight bias, it is extremely difficult to devise a method to 
forecast turning points in mean-reverting time series (see Fuster et al., 2010, for discussion). 
Moreover, it can reasonably be argued that, on average over an extended period,  projection 
of the most recent trend is likely to be as good a method for forecasting house prices as any 
other. The aim is, therefore, not to judge the quality of forecasts, but to understand how 
expectations were being formed.  
 
The analysis reveals that expectations of continued house price increases were not confined 
to households. The forecasts in four of the five commentaries (i.e. excluding the FSRs) were 
for further price increases in the year to come, in the range 3–6%; the fifth gave a forecast of 
a 27% rise in house prices over the following five years. Each of these professional 
commentaries, including those of the banks, made explicit quantitative reference to the 
                                                                                 
 
8  More precisely, this is the month when the Permanent tsb/ESRI House Price Index peaked. The 
retrospective CSO Residential Property Price Index peaked in Q3 2007. A time lag of 4-6 months is 
associated with these indices, because they are based on the drawing down of mortgages rather 
than the agreement of deals. Thus, in reality, actual house prices began to fall in late 2006 or early 
2007. 
9  It should be noted that no effort has been made here to examine the totality of relevant output 
written by the institutions or authors of the reports selected for analysis – a task beyond the scope 
of this paper and not commensurate with its aims. The purpose is only to analyse factors driving 
property price expectations just prior to the turning point in house prices. 
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most recent trends as their primary guide. With respect to the 2007 forecasts, all five 
reports quantified the first derivative of Irish house price indices over the preceding one or 
two years, with three out of four also quantifying the second derivative over recent months. 
A basic rationale for the forecast was common to all five: the current rate of house price 
inflation was the starting point and this was then adjusted somewhat to reflect one or two 
other factors, perhaps the current trend in the second derivative, the current trend in 
interest rates, gradually declining affordability, or in one case changes in immigration trends. 
The following are examples: 
 
“The pace of monthly house price increases continues to moderate. According to 
permanent tsb data, nationally prices rose by 0.7% in September, the first monthly 
increase of less than 1% since July 2005. On average prices rose by 0.9% per month in 
Q3 this year compared to the 1.4% average monthly increase in Q2. As a result, the 
annual rate of inflation edged downwards to 15.0% in September. We expect to see a 
further moderation in the monthly rate of price increases over the next couple of 
months as the impact of deteriorating affordability is felt. However, the annual rate is 
still likely to be some 12% or above by the end of this year but could fall to around 3 - 6 
% by end 2007.” (AIB, 2006, p. 2) 
 
“Between December 2005 and October 2006, new house prices rose by 8.8 per cent. 
We expect that the impact of current and anticipated interest rate increases should 
contribute to a moderation in inflation relative to recent months. We therefore 
assume that new house prices will increase by a rate of 10 per cent in 2006 and 6 per 
cent in 2007.” (Barrett, Kearney and  McCarthy, 2006, p. 12) 
 
The analytic structure here is a syllogism: the most recent trend and a source of downward 
pressure are combined to form the conclusion that the rate of increase will moderate.  
Although it is adjusted somewhat, the most recent rate of increase acts as the initial anchor, 
suggesting that the latest trend is accorded more weight than past trends, which are not 
considered. 
 
Further evidence comes from examination of the four annual FSRs, published by CBFSAI, 
which also covered commercial property. Recent year-on-year comparisons of the first and 
second derivatives of house prices were the initial and primary focus for analysis. The same 
method was then extended to an analysis of rental yields and commercial property. The 
implicit assumption throughout these analyses was, again, that the most recent trends were 
the starting point for considering the future. 
 
Thus, expectations of property prices were consistent with extrapolation bias among both 
the public and experts, including economic research teams at the major banks, independent 
economists and economists working for the authorities. As stated above, forecasting 
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techniques that embed extrapolation bias may be no worse than other methods in terms of 
average forecasting performance over a period. But they are likely to go awry where the 
series is mean-reverting and the recent trend is extreme, as was the case for property prices 
in Ireland. Overall, given the evidence above, it seems likely that extrapolation bias 
contributed to unrealistic expectations of further price increases among lenders and 
borrowers in Ireland’s property market. 
  
Ireland’s extraordinary economic performance and associated income growth from the early 
1990s onwards perhaps made it particularly vulnerable to extrapolation bias. Extreme trends 
during the boom were not confined  to property prices. When deciding how much to 
borrow, households must (intuitively or otherwise) estimate not only price movements but 
also future income and employment prospects. Extrapolation bias may have led them to 
overestimate both and thus to over-borrow. Similarly, it may have afflicted businesses’ 
estimates of revenue streams, especially but not only in property-related sectors.  
 
Extrapolation bias was a potential contributor also to the waywardness of Irish 
macroeconomic forecasts. In part, Irish forecasts were inaccurate for the same reasons that 
international forecasts were: forecasters underestimated the potential macroeconomic 
impact of failure in the financial markets, perhaps because of excessive faith in the efficient 
markets hypothesis (Nyberg, 2011). But there were also domestic factors. Whelan (2010) 
documents how forecasts prior to the crisis anticipated that Ireland would continue to 
outstrip growth in other developed countries, concluding that forecasters were over-
optimistic. This is possible, but extrapolation bias offers another explanation. Even where 
macroeconomic forecasters use formal models, they are not immune to the bias, which is 
often inadvertently built in by calibrating models with relatively recent data. More 
importantly, in truth, forecasting is part science and part art. Forecasters evaluate model 
output against intuition, which is potentially prey to extrapolation bias, especially where 
recent trends are extreme.  
 
In summary, surveys and published material relating property price expectations just before 
the crash are consistent with extrapolation bias. The most recent trends carried greater 
weight than past trends, leading expectations astray. The bias may also have affected 
expectations of other economic variables. Note that extrapolation bias is a cognitive rather 
than social or emotional phenomenon. It was possible to get caught up in Ireland’s bubble 
without falling victim to euphoria, frenzy, or even over-optimism. 
 
3.2  Confirmation Bias 
The original demonstrations of confirmation bias are due to Wason (1960, 1968), who 
designed experimental tasks in which people were asked to test abstract rules. Subjects 
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tended to seek positive instances of rules and failed to employ tests that could refute them. 
There is a large body of subsequent work on this bias (see Nickerson, 1998, for review). 
Experimental and survey evidence shows that confirmation bias applies also to the 
consideration of ambiguous evidence, which tends to be interpreted in line with prior 
beliefs; that the bias is exhibited by experts as well as lay-people; and that confirmation bias 
applies across many reasoning domains, including economic contexts with real rewards and 
costly acquisition of information (Jones and Sugden, 2001). It is important to understand 
that these demonstrations occur in contexts where agents have no vested interest in their 
belief being accurate, yet they nevertheless tend to seek information that might confirm 
rather that refute it.    
 
There were several critically important beliefs held prior to the banking crisis that were 
potentially subject to confirmation bias. For house buyers, investors, developers, bankers 
and bank supervisors, the main belief of interest was that high property prices would be 
sustained. The banks also had to assess beliefs regarding the ability of specific borrowers to 
repay loans. Those responsible for supervising the banks  needed to form and update beliefs 
about the impact that a fall in property prices could have on bank balance sheets and the 
extent of systemic risk to the banking system as a whole. Indeed, as the guardian of the 
public interest with respect to financial stability, CBFSAI had a particular responsibility to 
assess the likelihood of financial problems with wider societal consequences, requiring them 
to consider possibilities that others might not, i.e. to focus on low probability events. To 
some extent, this responsibility to protect the public interest also fell on the wider 
community of policymakers, journalists and academics working in relevant areas of 
economics and finance.  
 
With respect to property prices, it is interesting to scour the arguments considered by the 
2006 commentaries analysed in the previous section, two of which were written by the 
research divisions of the largest banks. Four out of five of the commentaries included some 
analysis of supply and demand factors affecting property prices, especially residential 
property (the exception is Barrett et al., 2006, which confined the discussion to the above 
quote). All four note the scale of price increases in Ireland and refer to suggestions that 
prices might fall. Thus, the reports display an awareness of an alternative perspective, 
although sustained high prices is the universal conclusion. Looking across these four 
commentaries, however, the balance of factors examined favours confirmatory evidence, 
especially on the demand side. All four reports refer to Ireland’s unique domestic 
demography and high immigration. Three refer to the need to “play catch-up” with the rest 
of Europe. Two point to falling household size. The only evidence cited that might question 
sustained high prices concerns likely interest rate movements and the possibility that prices 
may have outstripped “fundamentals”, although here again the balance of evidence cited 
suggests that fundamentals were pushing prices up.  
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The strongest evidence against the sustainability of Irish property prices was to be had from 
international comparisons and from history. What was occurring was unprecedented. Prices 
were extremely high by international standards and there was a history in other developed 
countries of strongly rising property prices being followed by substantial falls. Yet these lines 
of argument did not receive the same degree of attention as the confirmatory evidence and 
very little relevant data was sought, analysed or quoted.  
 
It might be thought that incentives existed for some analysts to “talk up” the market. This 
argument applies less to the FSRs, which analysed property prices on an annual basis. 
Between 2004 and 2006 these reports considered only one argument for a potential fall in 
prices, namely whether prices were higher than could be justified by “fundamentals”. The 
approach is summarised clearly in 2004: 
 
“In any assessment of the dangers for financial stability coming from the housing 
market, the concept of the fundamental house price is key.” (CBFSAI, 2004, p. 20) 
 
This claim, repeated in successive years, is debatable for reasons discussed below (Section 
3.4). Importantly for present purposes, it admits only one form counter-evidence to the 
sustainability of prices and, at a stroke, excludes the strongest forms. Indeed, after Kelly 
(2007) published estimates for OECD countries of the historical scale of house price falls 
relative to large price rises, the FSR 2007 dismissed the relevance of his work on the grounds 
that it did not centre on the relationship between prices and an estimate of “fundamentals”. 
Two other counter-arguments to Kelly were produced in the same report: that the analysis 
would not hold for nominal house prices and that history was anyway a poor guide, because 
we were living in an economic period characterised as the “Great Moderation”. This 
response is consistent with confirmation bias. Indeed, one established lesson of economic 
history is that financial crises tend to be preceded by dismissive rebuttals to warnings based 
on historical precedents, usually involving superficial arguments to the effect of “this time is 
different” (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). The morphing of the “Great Moderation” into the 
“Great Mortification” (Mirowski, 2010) is the latest in a long line.  
 
Of course, influences other than confirmation bias might explain the interpretation of Kelly 
(2007) in the 2007 FSR. But even if the argument is limited to assessments of prices against 
some measure of fundamentals, it turns out that the FSRs ignored negative evidence. 
Arguably the most sophisticated econometric treatment of the gap between prices and 
fundamentals was Murphy (2005), which concluded that prices were well above 
fundamentals as early as 2004. The FSRs emphasised in-house econometric analysis instead, 
which showed prices in line with fundamentals (e.g. CBFSAI, 2005, Chart 27).  
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The persistence of beliefs about the prospect of a soft-landing for the property market and 
the financial soundness of the banks is a theme of the official report into the performance of 
CBFSAI between 2003 and 2008 (Honohan, 2010), which highlights lack of scepticism and 
selective reading of evidence. For instance, with respect to the belief that the financial 
position of the banks was sound, the FSRs made little of in-house analysis of the commercial 
property market, which implied potentially serious problems for the banks (Kearns and 
Woods, 2006; Woods, 2007).  
 
Honohan (2010) also had unparalleled access to files and testimony, which helps to assess 
how the banks compared their beliefs with evidence. The report quotes from documents 
relating to an inspection by the Financial Regulator of five banks related to five particular 
property developers, which was conducted in December 2007: 
 
“all institutions confirmed to the inspectors that they have no concerns with the 
current or future repayment capacity of any of the borrowers.” (Honohan, 2010, p. 70, 
italics added) 
 
However, the inspection documents also note that the banks concerned had failed to obtain 
Net Worth Statements from one developer and that in other cases the statements had not 
been verified by a third-party. The banks’ beliefs about the ability of these developers to 
repay were firm and yet, at least in a number of serious cases, clearly not subject to 
standard banking procedures that are designed to test the truth of claims that are too easily 
assumed and accepted by both parties to a loan. Instead, the banks accepted weak 
confirmatory evidence, even when being interrogated specifically in respect of the matter. 
The portfolios being investigated were ultimately transferred to NAMA. 
 
In similar vein, when managers at one bank were questioned about exposure to property 
during an inspection in May-June 2007, the response was: 
 
“The number of customers that this bank backs for unzoned land is very small and they 
are very high net worth individuals, e.g. [Messrs X and Y], who have years of 
development experience.” (p. 69) 
 
Once again, the bank was relying on weak confirmatory evidence to support its beliefs about 
the ability to repay very large loans.  
 
These passages in the report are also notable for the number of different signals contained 
in the files of the Financial Regulator, and available to the Central Bank, to the effect that the 
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banks’ balance sheets might have become vulnerable. In addition to statistics showing that 
increases in bank lending were abnormally large by international standards and that loans 
were concentrated in the property-related sector, there were clear indications of poor bank 
documentation related to loans, of erroneous beliefs held by banks regarding the exposure 
of developers to other banks, and of more straightforward failures of governance 
procedures at certain banks. Given such signals, the possibility that one or more banks was 
vulnerable to a downturn in the property market was a hypothesis that CBFSAI could have 
put effort into testing. Although there were other potential influences involved,10 the 
phenomenon of confirmation bias predicts that even though the data and wherewithal for a 
quantitative examination of this hypothesis were available, time and effort would instead be 
directed to gathering evidence consistent with the prevailing theories that a soft landing was 
in store for the property market and the banks were essentially sound. From an examination 
of the contents of the FSRs, this is what occurred.  
 
The available documentation makes CBFSAI the main focus for assessing the role of 
confirmation bias, but as the earlier analysis suggests, there is also evidence that the bias 
supported important and erroneous beliefs held by the banks themselves and by other 
economic and financial analysts. One consequence, as Honohan (2010) concludes, is that no 
representatives involved in the meetings of officials prior to the announcement of Ireland’s 
extensive bank guarantee, on 30 September 2008, believed that any Irish bank, including 
Anglo-Irish Bank, might be insolvent. The problem was believed to be one of liquidity only. 
Confirmation bias may well have helped to ensure that no thorough quantitative analysis 
had been conducted, by CBFSAI or others, to test a hypothesis that was crucial to perhaps 
the most consequential decision of the crisis. 
 
3.3  Overconfidence Bias 
This bias manifests itself in two ways. First, we tend to be too optimistic regarding 
assessments of our own ability or personal outcomes. Second, we are inclined to believe 
that our assessments of likely outcomes are more accurate than they in fact are. These 
phenomena apply to many types of judgement. For instance, one classic psychological study 
found that 93% of drivers thought their driving skills were above the median (Svenson, 
1981).  
 
Overconfidence in real market settings has been recorded for consumers and workers (see 
DellaVigna, 2009, for review), but studies of financial and business professionals are of 
                                                                                 
 
10  For instance, Honohan (2010) conjectures that senior CBFSAI staff may have played down 
concerns because they were worried about causing public alarm, although Nyberg (2011) points 
out that this does not explain why they would play them down internally and in confidential 
communications with the government. 
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particular relevance here. Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) provide some powerful 
evidence of overconfidence bias among business leaders using corporate data. They 
identified CEOs who held on to their own stock options (rather than diversified) as 
“overconfident”. They then found that this proxy predicted corporate behaviour, including 
willingness to pay for mergers and to use available funds to invest in projects.11 Another 
study that may be telling in respect of Irish bankers, given the unprecedented and extended 
corporate success that occurred during Ireland’s boom, is Deaves, Lüders and Schröder 
(2010), who analysed dynamic data on overconfidence among stock market forecasters. 
They found that financial professionals were not only greatly overconfident in their 
forecasts, but also that their overconfidence increased in response to success.  
 
The growth in the loan books of Irish financial institutions between 2003 and 2006 (see 
Regling and Watson, 2010, Chart 8), during which average annual increases at the major 
lending institutions were all in excess of 25%, perhaps four to five times international norms 
for successful banks, certainly suggests that executives’ confidence in their abilities to back 
successful projects and people was remarkably high. To be sure, the increases in the loan 
books were in part responses to increased competition and a battle for market share (see 
below). Yet it seems that after years of growth and high profits, bankers had formed views 
regarding their own skill that were consistent with overconfidence bias. Lyons and Carey’s 
(2011) interviews with the Chairman and Chief Executive of Anglo-Irish Bank, Seán 
Fitzpatrick, repeatedly reveal an extraordinary confidence in the ability to judge the 
creditworthiness of individuals through little more than personal relations. Ultimately, 
Fitzpatrick himself identified this as a problem that beset the bank: 
 
“I was huge into people... The difference between Anglo and, say, AIB was not the 
product – in other words money. It was the people and the way they dealt with the 
customer base. That was the difference. That might have been the big mistake we 
made, but that was the difference.” (p. 45) 
 
The fact that Anglo-Irish allowed the responsibilities of its Chief Risk Officer to transfer to the 
Finance Director in 2007, over-riding standard checks and balances, underlines the extent of 
misplaced confidence in its own judgement. 
 
It can be argued that bankers were responding rationally to incentives in remuneration 
packages, which tended to place emphasis on market share and relatively short-term share-
price performance. Such incentives may have been influential, but many of the executives 
responsible for the growth in loans did not only bet the bank on their abilities, they also bet 
(and lost) millions of their own money, in the form of bank shares and personal property 
                                                                                 
 
11  Note that this finding was not due to insider knowledge, since the overconfident CEOs did not, in 
fact, benefit from holding on to their stock options. 
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portfolios (Nyberg, 2011). For bankers who had their own “skin in the game”, 
overconfidence bias provides a more consistent explanation of their behaviour. 
 
The second manifestation of overconfidence bias concerns people’s overestimation of the 
accuracy of assessments, referred to as “miscalibration”. Again, there are many 
experimental demonstrations of this across decision-making domains for the population at 
large, but miscalibration among senior management is especially relevant. Ben-David, 
Graham and Harvey (2010) surveyed a sample of Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) at US 
companies and asked them to predict stock market returns, including the 10th and 90th 
percentiles of the distribution of market returns. Consistent with laboratory findings, Ben-
David et al. found that realised returns stayed within the 80% confidence limit of the CFOs 
just 33% of the time over a period of nearly a decade. Even during the least volatile quarters, 
the confidence limit only covered 59% of returns. This finding is emphasised here because it 
gives an indication of the potential strength of overconfidence bias, even among those with 
expertise and experience operating in real markets. Often, biases in judgement and decision-
making are not small deviations from otherwise accurate judgements, but large distortions. 
Furthermore, decision-makers whose predictions happen to prove relatively accurate 
respond by further narrowing their confidence limits, i.e. positive feedback increases 
miscalibration (Deaves et al., 2010).  
 
The ubiquity and nature of miscalibration means that it is likely to have affected 
assumptions that were made by lenders and borrowers about the potential likelihood of 
negative events. Given the narrowing effect of positive feedback, this may have been 
particularly relevant for expectations of incomes and property prices in Ireland following a 
decade or more when average increases in both were strong and consistent. Miscalibration 
may also have led banks to underestimate the probability of radical change in international 
credit markets.  
 
A more concrete indication of miscalibration is the choice of scenarios for the stress tests 
conducted for the FSRs. This example is particularly instructive, because it shows how 
intuitions subject to biases can interact with more formal economic analysis. The rationale 
for selecting scenarios in CBFSAI stress tests was most clearly spelled out in 2004,12 where 
the FSR stated that:   
 
“[the scale of the shocks applied to macroeconomic variables] was chosen so that they 
each had a probability of between one in a hundred and one in a thousand of actually 
occurring, based on the historical behaviour of the series in question. These 
probabilities were calculated by considering percentage changes in these variables 
                                                                                 
 
12  In the absence of similarly precise statements of criteria, I assume here that the target probability 
of occurrence stated in 2004 applies to subsequent years also. 
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over a long timeframe, adjusted for any underlying trend in the series, and fitting an 
interpolated probability density function.” (Mawdsley, McGuire and O’Donnell, 2004, 
p. 106) 
 
The report went on to argue that the probability of all of the shocks occurring 
simultaneously was probably even lower than this. The task being undertaken here is not 
easy, as there are pitfalls aplenty in the available statistical methods for calculating extreme 
probabilities of events from historical data (Taleb, 2007). The particular method just 
described is approximate and potentially inaccurate, given evidence that some economic 
variables appear to have probability distributions with fat tails. As with other types of 
forecast, therefore, formal models must be combined with intuitions and judgement, which 
is where miscalibration may take its toll. In the event, the scenarios chosen for stress tests 
by CBFSAI were very much milder than what has in fact happened to the Irish economy in 
recent years. For instance, the 2004 stress tests assessed the impact on the banks of a 
recession resulting in a cumulative 5% drop in GDP over two years, with unemployment 
rising to 10% and house prices falling by 10%. The 2006 tests employed a 5% drop in GDP, 
unemployment at 10%and a 20% drop in house prices. We must be very wary of hindsight 
bias here, because it is possible that the probability of a recession as severe as the one 
Ireland actually experienced really was extremely low – perhaps we were just very unlucky. 
Yet in addition to Kelly (2007), which was prepared just months after the FSR 2006, Fitz 
Gerald et al. (2005) chose to simulate the impact of a house price fall of one-third, a figure 
that was based on an international comparison of house price cycles.13 The fact that other 
qualified analysts were contemporaneously considering more severe scenarios for the Irish 
economy would suggest that the probability of occurrence of negative events was being 
underestimated by CBFSAI, consistent with miscalibration.14  
 
Combining what was perceived at the time with what is known now, it is difficult to avoid 
the conclusion that the intuitions of borrowers, bankers and banking supervisors were in 
general badly miscalibrated, with the result that the Irish economy was at much greater risk 
than was perceived at the time, in relation to the property market, the stability of the banks 
and the associated macroeconomic prognosis. 
                                                                                 
 
13  It is important to distinguish this simulation from the warning given later by Kelly (2007). The 
scenario was meant to show that the size of the building industry had left the economy vulnerable 
to a shock that might affect house prices. One example given was a rapid change in US 
indebtedness, which might damage confidence in Ireland. Such a shock was “not inevitable” and a 
soft landing remained possible. By contrast, Kelly (2007) definitively stated that Ireland was 
experiencing a large house price bubble by international standards and that a dramatic fall in 
prices was indeed inevitable. 
14  Again, similar analysis can be applied to the global crisis in respect of the role of the US housing 
market.  In the context of arguing that economists and regulators were underestimating tail risk, 
Taleb (2007) wrote prior to the crisis that “the government-sponsored institution Fanny Mae, 
when I look at their risks, seems to be sitting on a barrel of dynamite, vulnerable to the slightest 
hiccup.” (p. 225, footnote) 
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3.4  Ambiguity Aversion 
Extrapolation bias, confirmation bias and overconfidence bias are relevant to situations 
where decision-makers must assess the likelihood of possible outcomes under uncertainty. 
Yet it is also the case that the nature of the uncertainty itself affects decisions. Since Ellsberg 
(1961), it has been understood that, over and above the general finding that we are risk-
averse, we prefer situations where the risk can be quantified to those where it cannot, even 
if the actual degree of risk involved is the same.15 That is, we have a general aversion to 
unquantifiable or “Knightian” uncertainty (Knight, 1921), more often termed “ambiguity 
aversion”. Amos Tversky (and colleagues) have since added a potentially important 
extension to Ellsberg’s work. The “competence hypothesis” states that the extent of 
ambiguity aversion is related to our feelings of competence, defined by how much we feel 
we know of what could be known. Experimental evidence  supports this hypothesis. We 
prefer to take risks in relation to events with which we are familiar than those with which we 
are unfamiliar, even if the extent of perceived risk is in fact the same (Heath and Tversky, 
1991; Fox and Tversky, 1995). This bias is consistent with the initially puzzling fact that 
financial portfolios tend to display concentration in more familiar assets, at the expense of 
apparently more rational diversity. For instance, investors’ holdings display concentration in 
stocks of geographically closer companies (Huberman, 2001) and in own-company stock 
(Benartzi, 2001).    
 
The upshot of this research is that, in addition to our tendency for overconfidence when 
assessing the scale of risks, we are also more willing actually to take a risk the more 
competent we feel, rightly or wrongly, about assessing it. Feelings of competence were 
arguably not in short supply in the later years of the Celtic tiger. Public discussion prior to 
2007 often implied or even claimed that the Irish economy was somehow operating a 
superior economic system to many other developed countries – the “Irish model” became a 
discussion point domestically and internationally. Low perceived uncertainty, including in 
respect of how the Irish economy as a whole worked and how Irish people did business, may 
therefore have been another factor that drove banks, businesspeople and households in 
Ireland to take on such large amounts of risk. This perception was epitomised in an interview 
given by Anglo-Irish Bank’s Finance Director, Willie McAteer, to Financial News in July 2003: 
 
“We operate in greater Ireland. London is eastern Ireland, Boston is western Ireland, 
and then there’s mainland Ireland. Culturally, they are very similar regions; it would 
terrify us to lend money in France, for example.” 
                                                                                 
 
15  Ellsberg showed this through examples of people’s willingness to bet on the colour of balls drawn 
from an urn. We instinctively value a bet more highly when we know that an urn contains balls of 
two colours split 50-50 than when we know that the urn contains balls of two colours in an 
unknown proportion, although the expected value of such bets is identical. 
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This expression of much greater willingness to lend in familiar regions parallels Tversky’s 
experimental work and is consistent with ambiguity aversion and the competence 
hypothesis. More broadly, this bias may go some way to explaining why so many wealthy 
Irish individuals, who lost fortunes in the crash, had such poorly diversified portfolios of 
assets. 
 
Our feelings of competence can themselves be biased, especially when dealing with complex 
systems. Rozenblit and Keil (2002) report convincing demonstrations of what they call “the 
illusion of explanatory depth”, whereby people systematically overestimate their 
understanding of complex systems across a range of domains, but especially systems that 
allow real-time explanations and consist of many perceptible parts – criteria that economic 
and financial systems fulfil.16 As economists, we therefore have reason to be wary of the 
illusion of explanatory depth. The extent to which the global crisis surprised the profession 
exposed excessive faith in formal economic and econometric models, and in markets 
generally. It seems that we overestimated our understanding and underestimated 
complexity and uncertainty (Lunn, 2008; Schneider and Kirchgässner; 2009; Colander et al., 
2009) – effectively, a collective illusion of explanatory depth.  
 
In the Irish case, this illusion was apparent not only with respect to the failure of 
macroeconomic models to foresee calamity, but also with respect to relevant 
microeconomic issues. Honohan (2010) argues that a majority of academic economists 
believed that house prices had “overshot equilibrium” by 2003-2004. The focus of 
economists at CBFSAI (see above), the OECD (2006), among the academic community more 
generally (e.g. Murphy, 2005) and, indeed, among economists at the major banks (AIB, 2006; 
Bank of Ireland 2006) was on comparing house prices to “fundamentals”. This expression is a 
short-hand for whether prices represent an equilibrium between supply and demand. 
Within this theoretical framework, the likely extent of a possible “correction” can be 
estimated by assuming that any price fall entails a return to equilibrium. This orthodox 
model of the housing market and the econometric models derived from it do not fit easily, 
however, with the volatile nature of historical house price series (e.g. Case and Shiller, 2003; 
Kelly, 2007), the cyclical patterns of which instead imply that prices frequently overshoot 
theoretical equilibria on the way down as well as on the way up. By placing faith in such 
models, however technically adept or sophisticated, even economists who concluded that 
prices had overshot fundamentals were likely to underestimate eventual price falls. Kelly 
                                                                                 
 
16  This bias was probably an important factor in precipitating the global financial crisis. The apparent 
sophistication of mathematical models developed to price innovative and complex securities led 
traders to overestimate their ability to calculate risks accurately, thereby reducing perceived 
uncertainty and increasing willingness to take on risk. When events revealed the inaccuracy of the 
models, willingness to take the same risks changed extremely rapidly (Lunn, 2008; Honohan, 2008; 
Barberis, 2010). 
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(2007) explicitly rejected such models as useful for understanding Ireland’s bubble and 
instead outlined models based on information cascades. 
 
3.5 Behavioural Convergence 
A vast interdisciplinary literature debates the rationality or otherwise of the fact that we 
tend to gravitate towards each others’ decisions and judgements. For instance, the theory of 
information cascades (Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer and Welch, 1992) proposes that we 
observe the decisions taken by others and then employ them as useful information on which 
to base our own decision. This makes good sense for decisions taken under uncertainty 
where others possess good information that we do not. However, information cascades can 
also lead to the propagation of mistakes, if individual decision-makers overestimate the 
quantity or quality of information possessed by others. Finer distinctions between 
information cascades, groupthink, bandwagon effects, herding, social learning and so on, 
suggest alternative rationales for imitative behaviour, reflected in the very many models 
that have been developed (see Rafaat, Chater and Frith, 2009). The different rationales 
include: to improve our own decisions, to maintain our reputation, to influence the decisions 
of others, to maintain group dynamics, to avoid majority sanctions, and more.  
 
Empirically, there is evidence of imitative behaviour among consumers (e.g. Huang and 
Chen, 2006) and in financial markets, which is extensively reviewed in Hirschleifer and Teoh 
(2003). These authors also examine the much smaller volume of research that investigates 
herding in corporate decision-making. Usefully for the present context, Morck, Sleifer and 
Vishny (1989) show that decisions by company boards to remove a management team are 
more common where company performance is below the industry average than where the 
company is in a poorly performing industry. Thus, evaluation of executive performance has a 
strong relative dimension; those who appear not to be keeping pace with the herd can get 
picked off. With reference to the global financial crisis, Shefrin (forthcoming) details 
evidence of banks trying to catch up with frontrunners through imitation. Internal 
documents at UBS bank reveal that while the bank initially stayed out of the market for 
mortgage backed securities, after an internal report identified this as a reason for its falling 
behind competitors it felt the need to increase its holdings. The result was huge losses and 
the ultimate bail out of UBS by the Swiss central bank. 
 
In the case of the Irish banks, there is an obvious analogy with the practice that became 
known as “chasing Anglo”. Anglo-Irish bank had increased its market share from 3% to 18% 
in a decade during which there was increased domestic competition and the entry to the 
market of foreign-owned banks. The drive to accelerate loan book growth and consequent 
lowering of lending standards may have partly reflected incentive structures, especially 
remuneration schemes that rewarded market share at the expense of longer term risk. Yet, 
as Lyons and Carey (2011) document, the primary method of competing with Anglo-Irish 
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appears to have been imitation. Executives at other banks explicitly targeted the same 
customers and employed similar methods to woo them, rather than taking independent 
decisions about which were the most profitable projects to back.  
 
Nyberg (2011) views such herding between banks as a strong factor in the development of 
the crisis. The Commission’s interviews revealed that the other Irish institutions viewed 
Anglo-Irish as a direct threat and bank executives and boards feared that failing to follow a 
similar expansion strategy might result in loss of customers, declining bank value, potential 
takeover and loss of professional respect. In some cases they were urged in this direction by 
consultants. Anglo-Irish Bank was an apparent success story that executives in other banks 
sought to emulate. This gravitation towards the “Anglo model” increased the concentration 
of loans in property and among specific developers.  
 
Behavioural convergence probably had an important role to play also with respect to 
consumer behaviour, but here it is harder to produce direct evidence and the analysis is 
therefore more speculative. Nevertheless, it is clear that the consistent and rapid growth in 
incomes and house prices meant that, for an extended period, taking out a mortgage for 
many multiples of household income appeared relatively safe and effectively became the 
norm. Moreover, unlike many other countries, Ireland had not experienced a crash in 
nominal house prices for more than a generation, so there were unlikely to be influential 
norms of borrowing behaviour borne of painful experience.17 In addition to the increasing 
amounts borrowed, there was a steep and steady increase in the proportion of loans with 
high loan-to-value ratios and mortgage terms of thirty or more years (Duffy, 2010). The 
prevailing wisdom was that it was important to “get on the property ladder”, regardless of 
how much one had to stretch to do so. The media may well have successfully egged 
consumers on. Property advertising and associated “journalism” became a very significant 
source of revenue for media outlets. Television shows obsessed about house buying and 
home improvements. Although international evidence in relation to the influence of the 
media in stoking house prices is sparse, there is good evidence that the media can have a 
“social amplification” effect in relation to perceptions and expectations of prices generally 
(e.g. Soroka, 2006). Given all these factors, in the years leading up to the crash the decisions 
facing younger adults and first-time buyers were particularly unpleasant. Those who 
considered holding out for a price fall could not have known how long they would have to 
wait, as prices rose, affordable properties seemed to shrink and creep yet further out of 
town, and the possibility of never being able to afford a home loomed. It takes courage to 
stay put when the herd gallops away.  
 
                                                                                 
 
17  The previous fall in real house prices in Ireland, which occurred over a five-year period in the 
early-mid 1980s did not involve sizeable falls in nominal house prices, thereby avoiding imparting 
some of the painful financial lessons presently being learned. Prior to that, there was a period of 
declining house prices in the 1950s. 
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Nyberg (2011) distinguishes herding, which occurs between individuals or organisations, 
from groupthink, whereby decision-makers are unwilling to depart or dissent from the 
decisions of their group. This phenomenon is very widespread in experimental and field 
studies of group behaviour (see Baron, 2005, for recent review) and seems to have been 
echoed in many interviews conducted by the Commission, both with individuals involved in 
banking and those working for the authorities. For employees holding private doubts about 
the riskiness of bank lending or the threats building up in the banking system, fear of 
sanctions or of loss of influence apparently trumped incentives to follow-up troubling 
analytical arguments or to express genuine professional concerns. Although there is little 
more than anecdotal supporting evidence, it is possible that such influences also affected 
the behaviour of journalists and academics, who potentially risked strong public criticism 
(including accusations of trying to cause a crash) if they promoted negative analyses. The 
reaction to Kelly (2007) suggests such concerns were not unreasonable. 
  
Lastly, returning to the banks, a specific context in which decision-makers influence each 
other is the committee. Given the number of committees with responsibility for oversight 
within the banks and CBFSAI (including the respective boards), biases specific to committee 
decision-making may also have played a role. In the absence of explicit structures designed 
to give voice to alternative viewpoints, group decisions tend to be more extreme than 
individual decisions (Sunstein, 2003), making it possible for committees to become less risk-
averse than individuals would be. Experimental studies in this area point to the importance 
of designing committee systems to ensure that minority viewpoints are aired and debated, 
as this moderates and improves decisions. 
 
3.6  Time Inconsistency 
One of the earliest and most established results of behavioural economics concerns 
behaviour in intertemporal choice experiments. When deciding between rewards separated 
by time, we discount the future at a non-constant rate, with a pronounced bias in favour of 
more immediate rewards (see Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2002, for review). 
The upshot of this “hyperbolic discounting” is that individual preferences are not consistent 
over time. Several impacts on consumer behaviour in the field have been observed, 
including with respect to credit card usage and pension contributions (DellaVigna, 2009).  
 
A field study of particular relevance is Ausubel (1999), who showed how manipulation of the 
“teaser rate” on credit cards could lead consumers to prefer cards with low initial interest 
rates that in fact turned out to be less beneficial for their borrowing patterns than the cards 
without the low rate. Given the low interest rates and aggressive marketing of mortgages 
that followed the introduction of the Euro, a similar bias would imply a disproportionate 
impact on the willingness of Irish households to take on debt. 
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Where this particular bias might have been especially damaging during the banking crisis, 
however, was in the various decisions that required individuals to weigh up the lure of 
immediate rewards (or the avoidance of immediate aggravation) against longer-term risks. 
This decision structure would have applied to any loan officers or mortgage salespeople 
whose remuneration and advancement were linked to the number of deals they made. It 
would have applied to executives whose remuneration was partly based on market share or 
short-term share-price movements. It would also have applied to board members and 
supervisors for whom questioning bank strategies or demanding changes entailed 
immediate costs (or risks) in terms of reputation and perhaps prospects, in a climate where 
profits and incomes were rising strongly.  
 
The problems of poor incentives and insufficient long-term incentives have been raised by 
many in the context both the global financial crisis and the Irish case. But the behavioural 
economics of intertemporal choice suggests not only that such incentive structures are 
poorly aligned, because they incentivise agents to take undesirable actions, but also that 
they are likely to be particularly powerful drivers of undesirable behaviour, because people 
have a disproportionate liking for more immediate rewards. 
 
3.7  Loss/Gain Asymmetry 
The groundbreaking work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) established experimentally that 
decision-makers respond asymmetrically to gains and equivalent losses. Specifically, losses 
appear to be weighted more heavily in our decisions than equivalent gains (i.e. we are loss-
averse)18 and, of particular interest here, our normally risk-averse preferences tend to 
switch to risk-seeking preferences in the domain of losses. Again, DellaVigna (2009) finds 
broadly supportive field evidence. 
 
The point is worth emphasising: evidence shows that we become risk-seeking (i.e. willing to 
take gambles of negative expected utility) to try to recover losses; gambles that we would 
not take in pursuit of equivalent gains. As the scale of the banking crisis began to emerge, 
many individuals faced the prospect of sizeable losses, both financial and reputational. To 
the extent that their behaviour matched what is typically observed in decision-making 
problems, those facing the losses could be expected to take some gambles, perhaps risking 
                                                                                 
 
18  There is good field evidence to suggest that loss aversion slows the adjustment of house prices 
during crashes. Genesove and Mayer (2001) obtained sales data during the 1990-1997 housing 
slump in Boston that included the original purchase price of sellers. Controlling for other 
characteristics, the quoted price for dwellings being sold at a loss was biased upwards. The 
implication is that the greater the proportion of sales that realise losses, the more likely are sellers 
to hold out longer for a higher price. In the Irish market since 2007, an equivalent effect may be 
slowing price adjustment and reducing sales volume. 
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further economic or reputational losses in the hope of recovering the situation. This 
behavioural pattern may help to make sense of the constant underestimation of the scale of 
the problem throughout the crisis by those in positions of responsibility. Denial may cause 
further poor decisions or come at the cost of being proved wrong again, or indeed of being 
seen to be in denial, but if there is a chance that the situation may turn around, then these 
further losses may be risked and the scale of the problem still denied. The propensity to take 
risks when facing losses may also help to explain why some people dig themselves into 
deeper and deeper holes, such as rogue traders, problem gamblers, or experts who refuse to 
accept that they got it wrong. This pattern suggests that when people with wealth and 
reputation face losses on the scale seen during Ireland’s banking crisis, it is a time to be wary 
of wrongdoing. At the moment of writing, various investigations are ongoing. 
 
4.  Conclusions and Implications 
Drawing on international literature in behavioural economics, this paper has hypothesised 
that seven established biases in judgement and decision-making played a role in the Irish 
banking crisis. Similarities between the circumstances of decision-makers during the crisis 
and contexts that are known empirically to produce biased decision-making, dictates that 
the hypotheses should be considered seriously. For each of the seven biases, international 
research provides experimental evidence of its influence in certain decision-contexts and 
field evidence linking it to real-world behaviour. Furthermore, while the evidence is clearly 
stronger for some hypotheses than others, the present analysis has located publicly 
available evidence relating to Ireland’s crisis that is consistent with a role for the seven 
biases. The analysis therefore adds a stronger behavioural economic dimension to previous 
analyses of the crisis, including the three official investigations.  
 
Yet we must be wary of confirmation bias here, since this exercise explicitly set out to seek 
signs that the relevant biases might have been instrumental. Given this, of the evidence 
offered in the Irish context, greater weight should arguably be accorded to tests that might 
potentially have refuted the hypothesis in question. For instance, the examination of a range 
of economic commentaries at end-2006 might have revealed that property price forecasts 
weighted past trends equivalently to recent trends, thereby refuting extrapolation bias. A 
similar argument holds for confirmation bias. Thus, the evidence for these two biases being 
instrumental is arguably stronger than the evidence supporting a role for other biases, which 
mostly consists of confirmatory instances gleaned from large amounts of interviews and 
testimony.  
 
Nevertheless, considering the seven phenomena at issue, the present analysis introduces a 
new perspective to attempts to understand Ireland’s banking crisis. Nyberg (2011) identifies 
the simultaneity of disadvantageous decision-making as central to understanding the crisis 
and offers herding and groupthink as potential explanations. Both of these phenomena help 
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to account for the simultaneity, since they are essentially about the influence on individual 
decision-making of observing decisions made by others. However, the present paper offers 
six other behavioural phenomena that potentially address the issue of simultaneity in a 
different way. These phenomena do not require a direct mechanism of contagion, be it 
through social observation or collective emotion. Instead, they result in simultaneity 
because where a particular decision context interacts with a systematic human behaviour to 
make a particular misjudgement likely, many people faced with the same context may 
independently make the same misjudgement at the same time. Illusions simultaneously fool 
us all, with no requirement for communication or contagion, because they exploit common 
human propensities. Thus, if the cognitive biases hypothesised were instrumental in 
Ireland’s crisis, then they entail a sort of economic illusion – an unreality seen and acted on 
simultaneously by many people, with different roles but similar intuitions. Heightened 
emotional states are not required. Contagion may amplify such biases in important ways, 
but it is not the root cause.     
 
This point is important for addressing the following question: why would these decision-
making biases have had a greater role in Ireland than elsewhere? Two answers to this 
question are offered here. First, the biases may have been enhanced by the length and 
extent of Ireland’s boom, which was extraordinary by international standards. Given 
available evidence, the boom could be expected to have: exaggerated the extent of 
extrapolation bias and overconfidence bias; reduced perceived uncertainty and increased 
perceived competence; increased the perception that other people were doing very well by 
taking property-related risks; increased opportunities for more immediate rewards; and 
increased the size of financial and reputational losses when the crisis broke. In other words, 
with the possible exception of confirmation bias,19 all of the biases considered were likely to 
be magnified either by the scale and/or length of Ireland’s boom. A sense of this can be had 
from the words of Simon Kelly, one of the few property developers to have publicly 
described his experience: 
 
“Once the bank trusted you, money was easily available to play in the duck shoot that 
was the Irish property market. It was a duck shoot because all you had to do was buy a 
site with money from the bank, and sell it when the market had risen. There was never 
an ‘if’ in this statement because we all expected the market to rise. A falling market 
was never considered a possibility because the Irish market had never fallen – or so we 
told ourselves. There had been blips in the past but house-price inflation had always 
kept these price falls very small and very short. We convinced ourselves and the bank 
that property was a rock-solid investment with very little risk.” (Kelly, 2010, p. 40) 
 
                                                                                 
 
19  One can make a case that confirmation bias might have been exaggerated by the length of 
Ireland’s boom, since there were sceptics of Irish economic success who increasingly appeared to 
have got it wrong. 
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This confessional passage contains at least three (confirmation, overconfidence, low 
perceived uncertainty) and arguably more of the seven biases at issue and gives an 
indication of how the combination of all of them may have led to such catastrophic 
decisions. 
  
The second reason why Ireland may have been especially prone to disadvantageous 
decision-making is that rules that existed to prevent it were not enforced and best practice 
not followed. Honohan (2010) and Nyberg (2011) list a large number of examples: the banks 
systematically violated their own stated policies on sectoral and individual lending limits, 
ignored lending criteria and failed to obtain standard documentation; the regulator did not 
correct governance failings, did not enforce prudential rules and allowed sectoral lending 
limits to be broken; the Central Bank did not respond to signals of excessive risk taking as 
dictated international best practice. Rules and practices have evolved in banking and bank 
supervision largely through painful experience. They mostly predate knowledge of the 
decision-making phenomena under discussion here. Yet they may nevertheless have acted 
to constrain the possibilities for poor decision-making, placing limits on how far biases could 
lure lenders and borrowers from well-trodden safe paths. Willingness to ignore these rules 
may have reflected lack of senior banking experience at executive and board level, as 
identified by Nyberg (2011). Ultimately, therefore, the combination of an extraordinarily 
long boom and a lack of banking experience due to Ireland’s relatively late economic 
development, may have created a fertile environment for biases to flourish. As described 
earlier, institutional and psychological factors potentially interact. 
 
If it were to be accepted that the behavioural phenomena hypothesised were instrumental, 
then what are the implications for policymakers? A number of possibilities might be 
considered, which can be grouped by decision-maker.    
 
Firstly, the extent to which households overextended themselves suggests that there is 
scope for improved consumer protection in the mortgage and other credit markets. The 
prevailing regulatory approach, both internationally and in Ireland, has been to provide 
consumers with as much information as possible and to assume that they will then take 
informed decisions in their best interests. Following recent events, this assumption is being 
questioned in the UK (e.g. Financial Services Authority, 2009) and the US (e.g. Barr, 
Mullainathan and Shafir, 2008). The latter contribution proposes that regulators might 
establish default products, such that innovations must be sold in a context where the extent 
to which they deviate from established safe borrowing norms would be clear to consumers. 
In the lead up to the crisis, it is possible that the presence of an official default mortgage 
product with a more conservative borrowing limit might have induced better consumer 
decisions. Regulators may also be able to supply online services that allow consumers to 
independently assess their own creditworthiness by historically normal standards. A more 
strident and straightforward approach would be to enforce more conservative borrowing, 
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through ceilings (e.g. on loan-to-value ratios) and the banning of products that exploit 
known behavioural biases (e.g. teaser rates). 
 
With reference to the banks themselves, one lesson is simple. Rules that have evolved over 
decades of banking practice are there for a reason. They should be enforced, by banks and 
authorities alike.  
 
The behavioural evidence examined here also adds to the weight of argument in favour of 
changing remuneration practices. In particular, there is a public interest argument for 
ensuring that executive compensation is dependent on long-term performance and risk 
management. A significant proportion of compensation could be held back for periods of 
five or even ten years.  
 
But perhaps the greater lesson one might draw is that until a way is found to place limits on 
human behaviour, bank failures and regular financial crises are perhaps inevitable. Certainly, 
they feature regularly throughout financial history (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). If so, then 
the case can be made for much more conservative regulation to prevent the inevitable 
damage. This might involve endorsement of international efforts to raise capital 
requirements substantially and to bring offshore vehicles under regulatory control. In 
addition, if and when crises do strike, the likelihood of increased risk-taking by those facing 
losses means that there is a behaviourally informed case for clearing out the executives and 
directors responsible as rapidly as possible, and making similar changes to the relevant 
personnel in the regulatory system.  
 
Turning to the role of financial regulation, despite our improved understanding of what 
contributes to bubbles, there remains no agreed mechanism for spotting them. That said, it 
is reasonable to assume that it would be useful for regulators to be better informed of the 
findings of behavioural economics and related fields, both from the point of view of 
monitoring the behaviour of consumers and financial service providers, and to ensure that 
their own decision-making limits the negative effects of known biases. Better knowledge, 
perhaps especially of confirmation bias, might have led to a more sceptical attitude to the 
claims being made by Irish banks and would surely have prompted a more open-minded 
approach to troubling analysis.  
 
Finally, it is not comfortable, as an economist, to address biases that may have had a 
detrimental effect not only on agents in the economy but also on the quality of analysis 
provided to policymakers by economists. Once hindsight bias is stripped away, regardless of 
technical skill and despite the fact that some warnings were given at different points, it is 
incontestable that the severe events that unfolded in Ireland after the turn of the 
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millennium were partly, perhaps largely, beyond the methods, models and intuitions of the 
profession. This observation is not limited to Ireland – so too were events on the global 
scale. Thus, the implication for the economics community is that we need to be open to 
alternative methods and models that might improve our intuitions.  
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